Pass the Cisco Certified Specialist - Threat Hunting and Defending 300-220 Questions and answers with Dumpstech

The correct next action is tosubmit the file for sandboxing. In professional security operations and threat hunting workflows, sandboxing is the most appropriate step when a file originates from an untrusted source and hash-based reputation checks return anunknownresult. An unknown hash means the file has not yet been classified as benign or malicious by threat intelligence databases, which is common with newly created malware or targeted attacks.

Sandboxing allows the security team to performdynamic analysisby executing the file in an isolated, controlled environment. This process observes runtime behaviors such as process creation, registry modification, network communications, command-and-control callbacks, file system changes, and exploit attempts. These behaviors provide high-fidelity indicators that static analysis or hash lookups cannot reveal.

Option B, reviewing the directory path, is useful for contextual awareness but does not determine whether the file is malicious. Option C, running a full malware scan, is premature; modern malware often evades signature-based scans, especially when the file is previously unknown. Option D, investigating the reputation of the website, is a supporting activity but does not assess the actual behavior or payload of the downloaded file.

From a threat hunting and incident response standpoint, sandboxing bridges the gap betweendetection and confirmation. If the sandbox analysis confirms malicious behavior, the team can escalate to containment actions such as isolating the endpoint, blocking hashes and domains, and performing scope analysis to identify other affected systems. Additionally, sandbox results can be used to create new SIEM detections and EDR behavioral rules, strengthening future defenses.

This approach aligns with professional best practices:unknown file + untrusted source = dynamic analysis first. It ensures accurate classification while minimizing unnecessary disruption to the user or environment.

The correct answer isdocument findings and operationalize detections. In Cisco’s threat hunting methodology, confirmation of malicious activity isnot the end of the hunt.

The most critical next step is to:

Document attacker behavior

Identify detection gaps

Create or improve SIEM, EDR, or NDR detection rules

This ensures the organization does not repeatedly rediscover the same threat. Options C and D are incident response and communication activities, not threat hunting lifecycle steps. Option A skips the crucial improvement phase.

TheCBRTHD blueprintstrongly emphasizes:

Continuous improvement

Feedback loops

Detection engineering

By operationalizing findings, the SOC increases maturity and forces adversaries to change tactics.

Therefore,Option Bis correct.

The correct answer isConnection status. In this scenario, the key challenge for the security team is differentiatinglegitimate outbound trafficfrommalicious or DDoS-related trafficoriginating from the same web server. Since both types of traffic coexist in the logs, analysts must rely on an attribute that meaningfully distinguishes normal behavior from abnormal patterns.

The exhibit shows numerous TCP connections from the web server to many different external IP addresses, with varyingTCP statessuch as ESTABLISHED, TIME_WAIT, and FIN_WAIT. These connection states are highly valuable for threat hunting and network analysis. During DDoS activity—especially reflected or amplification-style attacks, or when a server is abused as part of an attack—connections often remain half-open, rapidly transition to TIME_WAIT, or fail to fully establish. In contrast, legitimate web traffic typically results in stable, short-lived ESTABLISHED sessions that follow predictable patterns.

Option B (destination port) is not useful here because most web traffic—both legitimate and malicious—commonly uses ports 80 or 443. Option C (IP address of the web server) provides no filtering value because all traffic already originates from that server. Option D (protocol) is also ineffective, as both normal and DDoS traffic in this case use TCP.

From a professional SOC and threat hunting standpoint,connection state analysisis a foundational technique for detecting volumetric attacks, beaconing behavior, and abnormal session churn. By filtering logs based on connection status, analysts can quickly isolate suspicious patterns such as excessive short-lived connections, abnormal teardown behavior, or asymmetric session states that are characteristic of DDoS-related activity.

This approach aligns with mature threat hunting practices:when indicators overlap, pivot to behavioral attributes. Connection status provides the necessary behavioral signal to separate expected traffic from attack traffic and supports faster, more accurate incident response.

The correct answer isStructured threat hunting. In this scenario, the SOC team has alreadyconfirmed malicious activity—a compromised user account, anomalous VPN access, and indicators consistent with data exfiltration. Once an incident has been validated and attributed to adversary behavior, the next professional step is to performstructured threat huntingto uncover additional attacker actions across the environment.

Structured threat hunting ishypothesis-drivenand based on known attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), often mapped to frameworks such asMITRE ATT&CK. Here, the team can form hypotheses like:“If the adversary accessed the file server for exfiltration, they may have also attempted lateral movement, persistence, or privilege escalation.”Analysts then systematically query endpoint, identity, VPN, file server, and network telemetry to confirm or disprove these hypotheses.

Option A (Unstructured) is typically used at the earliest stages when little is known and analysts are exploring weak signals or anomalies without a defined adversary model. That phase has already passed in this case. Option B (AI-driven) refers to tooling or analytics methods rather than a threat hunting methodology. Option C (Proactive) is a general mindset applied to all hunting activities, not a specific hunting type used to investigate known attacker behavior.

From a professional SOC and threat hunting perspective, structured hunting enablesfull attack chain reconstruction. It helps identify secondary objectives such as data staging locations, additional compromised accounts, persistence mechanisms, and command-and-control activity. The outcome is a more complete understanding of the breach, improved containment, and stronger detection logic for future incidents.

This approach reflects mature security operations:once compromise is confirmed, hunt the adversary—not just the alert. Structured threat hunting ensures attackers are fully evicted and prevents repeat compromise through overlooked footholds.

The correct answer isC. Modifying this key requires administrative privileges, which the malware might not have.

The exhibit shows persistence established under the registry path:

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

This registry key is aper-user startup location, meaning any executable listed there will automatically run whenthat specific userlogs in. Crucially,write access to HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU) does not require administrative privileges—only the privileges of the compromised user account.

In contrast,

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

appliessystem-wideand causes programs to execute at startup forall users. However, modifying this key requireslocal administrator privileges. In many real-world breaches, attackers initially compromisestandard user accounts, not administrators. As a result, malware often chooses HKCU-based persistence mechanisms because they arereliable, stealthy, and achievable without privilege escalation.

Options A and D are incorrect because both registry paths are fully supported in modern versions of Windows and are explicitly designed for startup execution. Option B is incorrect because neither key automatically removes entries after a reboot—both are persistent by design.

From a threat hunting and endpoint detection perspective, this distinction is critical. HKCU persistence indicates:

User-level compromise

No confirmed administrative access (yet)

Potential precursor to privilege escalation attempts

This technique maps toMITRE ATT&CK – Persistence: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547.001). Mature SOC teams monitorboth HKCU and HKLM Run keys, but they interpret them differently when reconstructing attacker capability and progression.

In summary, the attacker usedHKCUbecause it enables persistencewithout requiring administrative privileges, makingOption Cthe correct and professionally accurate answer.

The correct answer isconsistent attacker tradecraft mapped to MITRE ATT&CK. Attribution at a professional level relies onbehavioral consistency, not superficial artifacts.

Advanced threat actors routinely rotate infrastructure, recompile malware, and vary filenames specifically to defeat attribution efforts. As a result, indicators such as IP addresses, hashes, and timestamps are unreliable and sit low on thePyramid of Pain.

What attackers cannot easily change ishow they operate. This includes:

Initial access techniques

Credential harvesting methods

Lateral movement patterns

Persistence mechanisms

Command-and-control behaviors

When these behaviors remain consistent across incidents, they form abehavioral fingerprint. Mapping these observations toMITRE ATT&CK techniquesallows analysts to compare activity against known threat group profiles maintained by intelligence providers and national CERTs.

Option A and B are weak indicators easily altered by attackers. Option D provides almost no attribution value, as timing alone is coincidental and unreliable.

Professional attribution requires correlating TTPs across campaigns and validating them against historical threat actor intelligence. This method supports high-confidence attribution used in legal, executive, and geopolitical contexts.

Therefore,Option Cis the correct and defensible answer.

The correct answer isstandardizing hunt documentation and hypotheses. Mature threat hunting programs move beyond ad-hoc, intuition-driven efforts.

Standardization enables:

Knowledge sharing

Consistent methodology

Repeatable hunts

Easier onboarding of new analysts

Option A and B support operations but do not improve hunting maturity. Option D is unrealistic and risky.

By documenting hypotheses, data sources, queries, findings, and outcomes, organizations institutionalize knowledge and continuously improve detection capabilities.

This is a defining characteristic ofhigh-maturity threat hunting programs.

Therefore, optionCis correct.

The correct answer isconverting hunt findings into permanent detection rules. This action reflects thehighest maturity outcomeof threat hunting.

Threat hunting is not complete until discoveries are:

Documented

Operationalized

Automated where appropriate

Without converting findings into detections, SOC teams repeatedly rediscover the same threats, wasting time and effort.

Options A and B increase noise and risk false positives. Option D improves experience but does not institutionalize knowledge.

Cisco’sCBRTHD blueprintemphasizes:

Continuous improvement

Detection engineering

Feedback loops between hunting and monitoring

By creating permanent detections, organizations:

Reduce dwell time

Improve consistency

Increase adversary cost

Therefore,Option Cis the correct and most Cisco-aligned answer.

The correct answer iscorrelating attacker behavior across multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques. This approach focuses onbehavioral detection, which is the cornerstone of effective threat hunting and advanced security operations.

Attackers who abuse legitimate administrative tools—often referred to asliving-off-the-land techniques—intentionally avoid malware-based detections. File hashes, signatures, and known indicators provide minimal value because there may beno malicious files at all. Options A and D sit at the lowest levels of thePyramid of Pain, making them easy for adversaries to evade.

By correlating behavior across multiple ATT&CK techniques—such as credential access, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and command execution—defenders detecthowthe attacker operates rather thanwhat toolsthey use. This forces adversaries to fundamentally change tradecraft, which is costly, risky, and time-consuming.

Option C improves visibility but does not inherently raise attacker cost. Threat intelligence feeds are reactive and often lag behind active campaigns.

From a professional threat hunting perspective, correlating multiple low-signal behaviors into ahigh-confidence attack patternis how mature SOCs detect stealthy intrusions. This method also supports scalable detection engineering, improved alert fidelity, and reduced false positives.

This strategy directly aligns with higher tiers of theThreat Hunting Maturity Modeland the top of thePyramid of Pain, making optionBthe correct answer.

The correct answer isIndicators of attack (IOAs). Unstructured threat hunting is typically triggered byweak signals, anomalies, or suspicious behaviorsthat do not yet meet the threshold of confirmed compromise. These early signals are best described as indicators of attack rather than indicators of compromise.

To understand this distinction, it’s important to separateIOAsfromIOCs. Indicators of compromise (Option A) include confirmed artifacts such as malicious hashes, known bad IP addresses, or identified malware. When IOCs are present, the organization is already reacting to a known or validated threat, which aligns more closely withstructured threat huntingor incident response—not unstructured hunting.

Unstructured threat hunting is exploratory in nature. It is often initiated when analysts notice something “off,” such as unusual login behavior, abnormal process execution, unexpected network traffic patterns, or deviations from baseline behavior. These observations suggestattacker intent or activity in progress, but without definitive proof of compromise. That uncertainty is precisely what drives unstructured hunts.

Option B (tactics, techniques, and procedures) is incorrect because TTPs are typically used to formhypothesis-driven, structured huntsbased on known adversary behavior frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK. Option C (customized threat identification) is vague and not a recognized trigger within professional threat hunting models.

From a SOC and threat hunting maturity perspective, unstructured hunting commonly occurs inlower to mid maturity environments, where hunters rely on intuition, experience, and anomaly detection rather than predefined hypotheses. It often serves as thestarting pointfor discovering new attack patterns, which can later be formalized into structured hunts and detection logic.

In short, unstructured threat hunting begins when defenders detectindicators of attack—signals that something malicious may be happening, even if there is no confirmed compromise yet. This makesOption Dthe correct and professionally accurate answer.