Pass the Fortinet NSE 6 Network Security Specialist NSE6_EDR_AD-7.0 Questions and answers with Dumpstech

The correct answer is C .

The exhibit shows a Threat Hunting saved query named CLI Command with the query:

Target.Process.Filename ( " net.exe " )

It is configured as a Scheduled Query , classified as Suspicious , and set to repeat every 15 minutes . The FortiEDR guide states that saving a Threat Hunting query allows it to be defined as a scheduled query to automate threat detection. When the scheduled query runs and detects matching activity, a security event is automatically created in the Incidents tab .

The guide also states that scheduled queries run automatically according to the configured schedule, and each time a match is detected, FortiEDR generates a security event in the Incidents tab and sends notifications according to the security event configuration.

So, when the endpoint runs:

net user edruser password! /ADD

FortiEDR records the relevant process activity, and when the scheduled query runs, it matches the target process net.exe and creates an incident/security event. It is not immediate by default because the query is scheduled every 15 minutes. It also does not block CLI commands by default unless playbook actions or policy controls are configured. The activity is treated according to the saved query classification, which in the exhibit is Suspicious .

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The correct answer is B .

In the exhibit, the incident status clearly shows Unhandled at the incident level and also on the event rows. The FortiEDR guide explains that every detected security event is initially marked as unread and unhandled , and these statuses help multiple FortiEDR Central Manager users track whether anyone has read and handled the message.

The guide also states that when a FortiEDR Central Manager user marks a security event as Handled , all users see it as handled. The process is performed by selecting the event and clicking Handle Incident or the flag icon, then saving the incident handling details.

So the valid observation from the exhibit is that the incident has not been handled by a console administrator .

Option A is not supported by the exhibit. There is no visible evidence that the policy is in Simulation mode. Option C is wrong because the incident is still visible, not archived or deleted. Option D is wrong because the status is explicitly Unhandled ; it was not handled automatically by a Communication Control policy.

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Comprehensive and Detailed 100 to 150 words of Explanation From FortiEDR 7.0 Administrator topics:

“This action blocks the communication to/from the affected Collector.”

“A Firewall Connector must already be configured in order to perform this action.”

FortiEDR Playbooks support separate remediation and investigation actions. The firewall-blocking action depends on the configured FortiGate connector, while Collector-based device isolation operates through the protected endpoint. If FortiGate is unreachable, the firewall action cannot complete successfully, but the independent Collector isolation action can still execute. The intended outcome is therefore successful device isolation with a failure recorded for the unsuccessful response.

Verification qualification: The documented firewall action blocks malicious remote addresses, not file hashes directly. Additionally, the Administration Guide does not explicitly define the overall playbook status when one action fails. Consequently, D is the strongest intended answer, but its aggregate failure-status behavior is not conclusively verified by the cited documentation.

The correct answer is C .

The FortiEDR 7.0.0 Administration Guide states that for on-premises deployments, the on-premise reputation service requests missing hashes from the cloud reputation service . If a proxy is not enabled, it requests the missing hashes from the cloud reputation service through the manager nginx . If a proxy is enabled, the on-premises reputation service requests the missing hashes through the proxy.

So, when the local reputation database does not contain the requested hash, the on-premises reputation server does not ignore the request, wait for endpoint input, or automatically block the application. It queries the cloud reputation service for the missing hash reputation data.

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The correct answer is A. Core.

For FortiAnalyzer / FortiAnalyzer Cloud integration, the FortiEDR 7.0.0 Administration Guide states that one prerequisite is “A Jumpbox with connectivity to FortiAnalyzer.” The same section says to refer to Setting up the FortiEDR Core for details about installing a FortiEDR Core and configuring it as a Jumpbox. In the connector configuration, the guide also states that the Jumpbox field is used to select the FortiEDR Jumpbox that will communicate with FortiAnalyzer or FortiAnalyzer Cloud.

So, the FortiEDR component associated with JumpBox capability is the Core. The Central Manager must have connectivity to Fortinet Cloud Services, but it is not the component configured as the JumpBox. The Aggregator handles registration, configuration, and monitoring between Collectors/Cores and Central Manager, and the Reputation Server is unrelated to FortiAnalyzer JumpBox communication in this context.

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The correct answer is B. Deny the application in the Finance policy .

The FortiEDR 7.0.0 Administration Guide states that Communication Control policies define the actions to be taken for a given application or application version . It also states that each Communication Control policy applies to specific Collector Groups , and all devices that belong to those Collector Groups follow that policy. A Collector Group can be assigned to only one Communication Control policy.

In the exhibit, the Collector C8092231196 is stated to be a member of the Finance group. Therefore, to block FileZilla for that Collector, the application action must be set to Deny under the Finance policy , because that is the policy context that applies to the Collector’s group.

The guide also explains that you can modify a policy action for an application/version so that the selected application is explicitly set to Allow or Deny for the relevant policy. When modified this way, the Application/Version Details area shows the action as manually changed and excluded from the original policy action.

Option A is wrong because assigning a Simulation Communication Control Policy to the DBA group does not affect a Collector in the Finance group. Option C is wrong because assigning the Finance policy to the DBA group would affect DBA Collectors, not the Finance Collector in the scenario. Option D is wrong because assigning the Finance policy to a broader group such as Default Collector Group is unnecessary and could over-broaden the policy impact. The precise action is to deny FileZilla in the policy that applies to the Collector’s own group: Finance policy .

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The correct answers are B and C .

The exhibit shows the event classification as Malicious . In FortiEDR, event classification can be performed by the Core and later updated by FortiEDR Cloud Service (FCS) . The guide states that the audit history shows the classification chronology and includes details when FCS reclassifies a security event after the Core’s initial classification. It also states that notifications can be based on either Core or FCS classification depending on whether FCS classification is received within the timeout period.

The exhibit also shows TestApplication.exe with Status: Running . That means the process was launched and is currently running on the endpoint. Therefore, C is correct.

Option A is wrong because the exhibit clearly shows Status: Unhandled , not Handled. The guide states that FortiEDR security events are initially marked as unread and unhandled, and users can later mark them handled through the incident handling workflow.

Option D is wrong because the exhibit shows rule indicators such as Invalid Checksum , Suspicious Packer , and Writable Code , but it does not prove that TestApplication.exe is “sophisticated malware.” FortiEDR classifies the event as malicious, but the guide’s Malicious classification means the event is verified to have malicious capability, is intended to harm the infected device, and has no commercially viable use; the exhibit alone does not justify the stronger claim “sophisticated malware.”

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The correct answer is C.

The FortiEDR 7.0.0 Administration Guide explains that Identity Management integration can use FortiClient EMS. The connector requires API credentials or FortiCloud credentials depending on whether FortiClient EMS is on-premises or cloud-based. The guide states that for the out-of-the-box action, such as Zero Trust device tagging on FortiClient EMS, FortiEDR tags the device as non-trusted in the identity management system and specifies the classification tag to apply in the Tag name field.

The guide also lists predefined FortiClient EMS 7.2 or later fabric tags used by FortiEDR, including FortiEDR_Malicious, FortiEDR_PUP, FortiEDR_Suspicious, FortiEDR_Likely_Safe, and FortiEDR_Probably_Good. These tags are used by FortiClient EMS to tag the endpoint based on FortiEDR classification.

Finally, the guide states that to configure the automated response, the administrator must go to Security Settings > Playbooks, open the relevant Playbook policy, and place a checkmark in the relevant classification column next to the Zero Trust device tagging row under Remediation. FortiEDR is then configured to automatically tag a device as non-trusted when a security event is triggered.

Options A, B, and D are wrong. FortiEDR does not remove unmanaged endpoints, does not apply a default tag to every endpoint, and does not disable the endpoint merely until a tag is assigned. The action is API-based FortiClient EMS tagging tied to FortiEDR event classification

The correct answers are B and D .

The exhibit shows a Process Creation activity event where cmd.exe is the source process and PING.EXE is the target process. The displayed Executing user is R2D2-KVM63\fortinet, and the command line shows fortinet.com, which means the user fortinet executed a ping command targeting fortinet.com.

The FortiEDR guide explains that Threat Hunting activity events consist of a source , an action , and a target . It also states that Process Actions have another process as the target and include process-related actions such as Process Creation .

The exhibit also shows file-related details for the executable, including the executable path, product, SHA1 hash, and command line. In FortiEDR Threat Hunting, process execution events are tied to executable-file metadata, so the event is associated with the executable file involved in the process action. This supports B in the exam’s intended wording.

Option A is not reliable because the screenshot does not prove MITRE details are unavailable; it only shows that no MITRE detail is visible in the current portion of the details pane. The guide states that MITRE indications appear when an activity event has related MITRE information.

Option C is wrong because the screenshot shows the process status as Running and does not show a block indicator. A green check does not mean blocked; it indicates a trusted/signed/allowed status context. There is no evidence that PING.EXE was blocked.

The correct answer is D .

The FortiEDR guide confirms that Playbook actions are automatic incident response actions configured under Security Settings > Playbooks and applied based on security event classification. It also confirms that actions such as Terminate Process and device isolation actions can be configured as playbook responses. For scheduled-query-triggered events, the guide states that FortiEDR can automatically apply the Playbook action assigned to the Collector Group that the triggering device belongs to.

For isolation, the guide shows that isolation actions such as Isolate device with NAC are configured under the Investigation section of Playbooks, and similar isolation actions are triggered automatically when selected for the relevant classification.

The uploaded guide does not provide a specific line saying “if terminate process fails, continue to the next action.” Based on FortiEDR playbook behavior, configured actions are executed independently. A failure to terminate a protected Windows process does not automatically cancel the remaining playbook actions. Therefore, the next configured action, isolate device , is still executed.

Options A , B , and C are wrong because the playbook does not pause for administrator intervention, does not stop merely because an email is generated, and does not cancel all remaining configured actions because one action failed.

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